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The first case of Covid-19 in Malaysia was first confirmed on January 25, 2020 with
three Chinese nationals who arrived from Wuhan in Malaysia via Singapore. Yet
it wasn’t until a religious gathering from February 27 to March 1 with over 16,000
people attending that community transmission in Malaysia became widespread. As
of May 13, Malaysia has reported 6,779 confirmed cases, 1,709 active cases, 5113
recoveries and 109 deaths.
From “new” Malaysia back to “old” Malaysia?
Two simultaneous narratives are unfolding as Malaysia responds to Covid-19. The
first and my main focus is the specific character of the ongoing legal response. The
second is salient backdrop to any evaluation of this legal response that Malaysia
is in political turmoil. In March, the government led by the Pakatan Harapan (“PH”)
collapsed. PH won the 2018 elections with a historic result defeating the United
Malay National Organization (“UMNO”). UMNO had helmed government for six
decades and was authoritarian, corrupt, and incompetent. However, a major
international scandal (“1MDB”) where billions of dollars were stolen allegedly by
the former Prime Minister Najib Razak and his cronies from a national state fund
brought down the regime, ushering an era of democratic change dubbed the “new”
Malaysia. Unfortunately, a series of political machinations caused PH to collapse.
A new coalition called the Perikatan Nasional (PN”) comprising mainly UMNO and
the Parti Islam Malaysia (“PAS”) emerged to form a government and was appointed
government by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, i.e. the King. Parliament remains
prorogued until May 18th when the PN government may face a vote of confidence.
When UMNO was in power, it practiced “rule by law”. While the rule of law is
commonly distinguished from arbitrary power, rule by law involves the use of
the legal form, especially legislation, as a cloak for arbitrary power. In Malaysia,
rule by law typically involves the use of legislation to grant public officials wide
discretion that is immunized from judicial oversight using legislative ouster clauses
that limit or exclude judicial review. To operationalize this approach, the UMNO
government tightly controlled Parliament and undermined judicial review giving rise
to an executive-dictatorship. Executive-minded judges would treat any intimation
by a public official that a decision complies with the law as sufficient to confirm the
legal legitimacy of that decision. The purpose of rule by law was to project an aura of
legitimacy when in fact exercising legally uncontrolled and arbitrary power, making
law an instrument used to dominate legal subjects and to pursue authoritarian rule.
With UMNO back in power, rule by law is likely to return.
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Constitutional carte blanche
So far, the PN government has not utilized emergency powers under Article 150
of the Malaysian Constitution. The provision grants the King authority to proclaim
a state of emergency if he is satisfied that there is a serious threat to “security”,
“economic life”, or “public order”. Since by convention the King acts on the advice
of the Prime Minister, in practice these powers accrue to the ruling government. If,
as is the case now, Parliament is not sitting during the emergency, the King can rule
by issuing decrees which may derogate from constitutional limits on state power,
including limits in the constitutional bill of rights. Significantly, the King’s subjective
judgment that there is an emergency and decisions about how to respond to that
emergency are immune from judicial review. Article 150 thus effectively grants a
blank cheque to the government to undermine fundamental liberties in the exercise
of emergency rule.
Instead, the response to Covid-19 has been governed by ordinary legislation,
principally The Prevention and Control of Diseases Act 1988 (“PCDA 1988”). The
effect of the PCDA 1988 is to put the Director General of Health (“the Director”)
in charge. The Director is empowered to create new regulations and offences
enforceable with the assistance of the police in response to the threat. Hence, on
March 20th, a Movement Control Order (“MCO”) was issued. The MCO prevents
people from leaving home save for essential purposes like acquiring food or
medicine; bans public gatherings; orders the closure of most government institutions,
educational institutions, and businesses; seals Malaysia’s international border
and bans inter-state travel. In areas with a concentrated cluster of Covid-19, an
Enhanced MCO applied with stricter limits on movement. Violators are subject to
a fine of RM1, 000 or six-months imprisonment. The police and the military were
brought in to help enforce the MCO.
Presently, daily infections and death rates have dropped sufficiently for the
government to downgrade to a Conditional MCO that allows greater movement and
for some institutions and businesses to reopen. However, more stringent versions of
the MCO remain in areas where infection rates remain undesirable.
The National Security Council – Adviser with
virtually unfettered powers
The legal response following the PCDA 1988 has been relatively reasonable and
effective with authorities generally acting conscientiously to safeguard public health.
However, the risk of rule by law remains because the National Security Council
(“NSC”) is also advising the government. The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister
and comprises three Ministers, including the Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs,
as well as the Chief of Defence and the Chief of Police. The NSC draws authority
from the National Security Council Act 2016 (“NSCA 2016”). The NSCA 2016 allows
the Prime Minister on the advice of the NSC to declare a “national security area”
– an area that is “seriously disturbed or threatened by a person, matter or thing
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which is likely to cause serious harm to the people, or serious harm to the territories,
economy, national key infrastructure of Malaysia or any other interest of Malaysia,
and requires immediate national response”. Any such declaration is valid for six
months but is subject to indefinite renewals. Within a national security area the NSC
has power
“to do all things necessary or expedient…notwithstanding any other written
law, including controlling and coordinating government entities with respect
to national security operations and issuing directives to such entities on
matters concerning national security”.
Using this power, the NSC can then authorize security forces to detain without
warrant, seize property, and to impose curfews at will. Again, any decisions taken
under the authority of the NSCA 2016 are immune from judicial review. To the extent
that there may remain textual hooks in the legislation for such review, Malaysian
courts are notoriously deferential towards government in cases of national security,
where such deference even is more likely given doubts about the independence of
the Malaysian judiciary.
The NSCA 2016 is deeply problematic. It makes hash of the separation of powers by
centralizing almost total power in the hands of the NSC and encourages an official
mindset that inclines towards arbitrary power. Here one should not underestimate
how institutional design shapes the role morality of officials. Therefore, even if
there is presently no clear evidence that the PN government wishes to use the vast
powers under the NSCA 2016, any involvement of the NSC in the official response
to Covid-19 is therefore potentially problematic because the tendency of the NSC will
be towards arbitrary and authoritarian decision-making.
There are signs of this problem beginning to arise. For instance, the newly minted
Minister of Defence stated that the NSC has the sole authority to issue directives,
despite the PDPA 1988 giving such authority to the Director General of Health. It
appears that the NSC is asserting a greater role in determining the response to
Covid-19. Here the involvement of the military in assisting with the enforcement
of the MCO is revealing since military involvement requires a declaration that an
area is a security area under the NSCA 2016. Thus far there has not been any such
declaration. Hence, it would seem that the NSC is acting in a way that goes beyond
its legal remit.
Again, that the NSC would do so is unsurprising given that the NSCA 2016
eviscerates the principle of the separation of powers by concentrating power solely
in its hands. Hence, an official acting in the name of the NSCA 2016 will conceive
of his role in a way that is not limited by jurisdictional limits, opening the door to
authoritarian impulses. Such impulses are on display when the Minister of Defence
also warned that those who misreport the government’s response to Covid-19 would
face stern action. The context for the warning was a report about the rounding up of
undocumented migrants and their treatment, which imperiled their health and safety.
Indeed, the report eventually made international headlines. In reaction, the police
called in two local journalists for potential violation of the Penal Code to determine if
they had committed “intentional insult with the intent to provoke a breach” of public
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peace. No charges were brought but the journalists were harassed for exercising
their democratic and constitutional right to free speech. Of course, the harassment of
journalists who criticize the government was also characteristic of authoritarian rule
under the previous UMNO regime.
Judicial Independence in question     
In addition, there are depressing signs that the courts are not being impartial in
dealing with those linked to the PN government. When the daughter of the present
head of UMNO, Zahid Hamidi (who is also being investigated for corruption), was
charged for violating the MCO, she was punished with a relatively light fine. The
decision invited backlash because ordinary citizens had to pay heftier fines or had
been sentenced to jail. While hers is but one case, it is revealing that former Prime
Minister Najib Razak, who is being prosecuted for offences related to 1MDB, let slip
he will sue his critics once his cases are “settled”. The impression is that those linked
to the PN government are above the law.
Democracy and the rule of law as victims of
Covid-19
There are also troubling indications that the rot of corruption in government is
returning. Principled individuals appointed by the PH government to facilitate
democratic reform have been sacked or have resigned. Unqualified appointees have
been given positions of authority in government and others handed plum positions in
Government-linked Corporations. While Covid-19 blazes on, ruling elites associated
with PN are realigning and taking control of the state-capitalist structure to conserve
their position.
When Parliament reconvenes on May 18, the PN government could face a vote of
confidence. The indications so far are that any legislative proceeding will be very
brief and the focus will be on how to respond to Covid-19. If PN loses the vote, the
King could in theory appoint PH as the new government with proof that it commands
a majority. Or, there could be a snap election. However, my general sense is that
people have no appetite for another change in government and would prefer a
steady hand in government to manage the ongoing health emergency triggered by
Covid-19. Indeed, there is some talk of a July sitting of Parliament where a wider
package of legislative initiatives (the details of which remain undisclosed) will be
mooted. Therefore, if there is a vote of confidence and PN survives, I suspect that
PN will consolidate its position thereby marking the progressive return of rule by law
and authoritarian politics. Paradoxically, if PN continues to successfully mitigate the
threat posed by Covid-19, this success may be enough to overcome the perception
that it is an illegitimate “backdoor” government. But the result-cherished ideals of
political morality will be among the many victims of Covid-19 – democracy, the rule
of law, and respect for fundamental human rights.
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